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· 
This experiment investigated the effects of subsequent related information 
and individual differences in cognitive flexibility on prose recall. Subjects 
read a passage and then were given either consistent or contradictory inciden­
tal information. Errors in cued recall, reflecting the nature of the subsequent 
information, were more frequently produced after a 3-week delay than after 
2 days. These results were consistent with Spiro's findings with free recall. 
In addition, 3-week subjects were more confident about correct recall than er­
rors, indicating that errors resulted, in part, from retrieval processes. The 
negative relationship of spontaneous flexibility and the positive relationship 
of adaptive flexibility to constructive error are interpreted in terms of storage 
and retrieval effects in memory. 
The present study was concerned with 
the dynamic nature of memory schemata 
and the extent to which cognitive style may 
relate to recall accuracy. Evidence from 
several sources (Anderson, Spiro, & Ander­
son, 1978; Bransford & Johnson, 1972; Pi- . 
chert & Anderson, 1977; Royer & Cable, 
1976; Sulin & Dooling, 1974) supports the 
notion that information is assimilated into 
existing knowledge structures (schemata). 
From the perspective of schema theory (e.g., 
Piaget, 1952), a knowledge structure should 
provide a framework not only for the as­
similation of related information consistent 
with its content but also for the accommo­
dation of its content to related but disparate 
information. 
The issue of accommodation has impor­
tant implications for education, some of 
which have been suggested by Anderson 
(1977). In terms of schema theory, all 
knowledge acquisition is viewed as modifi­
cation and differentiation of existing sche­
mata. If the goals of education involve the 
change of knowledge, then we must be con­
cerned with the modification of existing 
schemata when confronted with information 
requiring varying degrees of accommodation. 
Furthermore, educational theory must be 
concerned with individual differences that 
Requests for reprints should be sent to Paula T. 
Hertel, who is now at the Department of Psychology, 
University of Minnesota, Duluth, Minnesota 55812. 
are predictive of the degree to which existing 
schemata assimilate or accommodate con­
flicting new inputs. 
In an attempt to systematically investigate 
mechanisms of schema change, Spiro (1975, 
1977) argued that varying the type of sub­
sequent information should affect the degree 
of error in what is remembered about the 
original event. For some subjects, he pre­
sented incidental subsequent information 
that was either consistent with or contra­
dictory to information in a story that 
subjects had previously read, predicting 
transformational errors in story recall for 
only those subjects who heard contradictory 
information. Half of Spiro's subjects re­
ceived memory instructions, whereas the 
others were deceived into believing that they 
would be asked to evaluate the material at a 
later time. Since memory instructions de­
mand isolation of passage information, er­
rors were predicted for the deception con­
dition only. Retention was tested after 2 
days, 3 weeks, or 6 weeks. Following story 
recall, all subjects were asked to rate each 
sentence in their recall protocol, according 
to their degree of confidence that it accu­
rately represented information stated in the 
original story. 
As expected, Spiro found that all subjects 
in the memory condition and those deceived 
subjects who heard consistent subsequent 
information were essentially accurate in 
their recall. However, after long retention 
intervals (3 or 6 weeks), the deceived subjects 
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who heard contradictory information made 
errors that reflected the nature of that in­
formation. When similarly treated subjects 
were tested after 2 days, these errors did not 
occur. Therefore, schemata were not im­
mediately modified by the presentation of 
the subsequent information. Rather, during 
the passage of time, subjects may have lost 
the ability to distinguish information pre­
sented in the story from information inferred 
from the "aside" that was delivered subse­
quently. This loss of ability may result from 
confusion, or it may reflect hypothesized 
changes in the story schema. 
A stage analysis (cf. Crowder, 1976) of the 
locus of schema change would indicate that 
the effects in Spiro's experiment occurred 
during information storage or at the time of 
retrieval. Confidence ratings were obtained 
to address this issue. The subjects who had 
heard contradictory information and were 
tested following 3 or 6 weeks were more 
confident in errors influenced by the con­
tradictory information than they were con­
fident in accurate recall. This finding sug­
gested to Spiro that the same reconstructive 
process was used to produce accurate and 
inaccurate recall; he concluded that errors 
were not produced at retrieval, through the 
use of a conscious guessing strategy, but re­
sulted from modification of the schema 
during storage. 
The first purpose of this experiment was 
to determine if Spiro's results were valid 
under more stringent test conditions that in 
turn would provide more evidence con­
cerning the locus of schema change. The 
fact that Spiro did not request confidence 
ratings until after the story was recalled al­
lows for the possibility that subjects who 
were tested after longer delays had difficulty 
retrieving enough information from the story 
to comply with task demands, accessed the 
subsequent information, and consciously or 
unconsciously used it to elaborate their re­
call. Regardless of the nature of the re­
trieval processes, the test demands would 
require subjects to integrate all information 
to write a well-connected story. Thus, it is 
possible that the subsequent confidence 
ratings reflected integration at recall, as well 
as the type of retrieval processing. 
The following experiment departs from 
Spiro in two important ways. First, a 
cued-recall task was employed to reduce the 
integrative demands of the test situation; if 
the errors observed by Spiro reflected pro­
cesses operating prior to retrieval, then the 
type of recall test should not affect the 
qualitative nature of the errors, although 
their magnitude may be decreased by the 
restrictive nature of the cues. Second, 
confidence ratings were requested immedi­
ately following each answer, requiring 
subjects to monitor their retrieval efforts. 
The second purpose of this experiment 
was to examine individual differences in re­
call accuracy from the theoretical perspec­
tive of schema change. Since research con­
cerned with knowledge structures places a 
large emphasis on idiosyncratic processing 
(Perfetti & Lesgold, 1977; Spiro, 1977), it is 
reasonable to suggest that identifiable cog­
nitive styles may correspond to processes 
involved in schema change. Memory for 
events may be transformed according to the 
type of person who is processing the event. 
Cognitive flexibility has been identified by 
Guilford (1967) as an important factor in 
discriminating among individual abilities. 
Defined as the ability to shift avenues of 
thinking in order to perceive and process 
information about a situation in different 
ways, cognitive flexibility is similar, on an 
intuitive level, to a description of schema 
change. In studies by Guilford and others 
(Houston & Mednick, 1963; Munsinger & 
Kessen, 1966; Vidler & Karan, 1975), cog­
nitive flexibility has been associated with the 
ability to tolerate and structure ambiguity. 
Furthermore, Kaplan (1952) reported that 
subjects with a high tolerance for instability 
more readily recalled equivocal parts of 
stories than did other subjects. These 
findings suggest that at least one type of 
cognitive flexibility, spontaneous or adap­
tive, should be related to performance in this 
experiment. 
Spontaneous flexibility is conceptualized 
as the ability to think in varied directions in 
an unstructured situation, such as the inci­
dental learning task in this experiment. 
Tests for spontaneous flexibility do not re­
quire flexibility for their solution, although 
the magnitude of the score depends on the 
spontaneous use of these processes. Simi-
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larly, the incidental nature of the subsequent 
information in this experiment does not re­
quire that it be kept separate from story in­
formation. The test for another subfactor, 
adaptive flexibility, does require flexible 
thought processes for problem solving, and 
therefore characterizes flexibility in situa­
tions that demand it. The test conditions of 
this experiment may be viewed as placing 
certain restrictions on subjects' recall. 
Logically, constructive effects that result 
from storage mechanisms should be related 
to spontaneous flexiblity, whereas those 
occurring at testing should be related to the 
amount of flexibility required by the recall 
task, and thus to adaptive flexibility. More 
generally, cognitive flexibility was expected 
to be a reliable predictor of memory perfor­
mance, in addition to the characteristics of 
the experimental setting. 
Method 
Materials 
The material to be recalled was adapted from Spiro's 
(1975, 1977) passage about a young woman and man 
who met in college, developed a romantic relationship, 
and made marriage plans. The central theme of the 
story concerned the young man's desire not to have 
children and his hesitancy to inform the woman about 
this desire. He finally does tell her, and the story ends 
either with her sharing his desire not to have children 
because she had always wanted a career (harmony), or 
she becomes distraught by the news because she had 
always wanted a large family (conflict). 
Test booklets consisted of 10 questions, prompts, or 
statements with a blank to be filled in; each of the 10 
items was presented on a separate page. The first 5 
filler items concerned details from the first part of the 
story, and answers were not viewed as potential sources 
of constructive errors. The remaining 5 items ad­
dressed the nature of the relationship, and were con­
structed to allow for intrusions emanating from the 
subsequent bias. All items are presented in the fol­
lowing display: 
Cued Recall Test 
1. When Bob and Margie met they were both 
___ years old. 
2. Bob was majoring in --· 
3. Margie was majoring in --· 
4. They didn't know each other until __ . 
!). Bob began to think he would like to marry Margie, 
after he had known her for --· 
6. Margie's feelings about Bob could be characterized 
as: 
7. When Bob asked Margie to marry him, she: 
8. Bob and Margie's feelings about having children 
were: 
9. What were Margie's goals for the future? 
10. How did the story you read end? 
For Items 6-10, a priori scoring continua were de­
veloped to reflect the direction of possible errors. Zero 
points were established for essentially accurate recall, 
the negative range was reserved for errors leading to a 
distortion of the conflict in the relationship, and the 
positive range was relegated to errors that would in­
crease the harmony. For Item 7 the continuum ranged 
from hesitancy to say yes ( -5 to -1), to acceptance (0), 
to enthusiasm ( + 1 to +5). Since magnitude was not 
considered as important an aspect of the replication as 
direction of error, the numerical value of the error score 
was not predetermined apart from establishing a posi­
tive correspondence between the degree of error and the 
magnitude of the score. 
Two tests of spontaneous flexibility were employed 
(Object Naming and Utility). For the Object Naming 
test, subjects were required to name instances of each 
of two successively presented categories (liquids and 
plants), and scores were determined by the number of 
subcategorical shifts (from fruit juices to medications, 
e.g.). The Utility test was similar; subjects must name 
uses for each of two objects (brick and pencil), and the 
number of functional shifts was scored. For the Match 
test of adaptive flexibility, subjects were instructed to 
vary their solutions to the problem of removing a 
specified number of matches and leaving only matches 
that contributed to squares; scores were tabulated by 
counting the number of different solutions (removing 
corner matches vs. center matches, e.g.). 
Subjects 
Seventy students volunteered for two sessions, par­
ticipating in groups of 6-10 during the acquisition phase 
and 2-5 during the test phase. They received credit 
toward their introductory class grades. Groups were 
assigned to acquisition conditions on the basis of 
maintaining an equal male-female ratio across condi­
tions. 
Procedure 
All subjects were told that data would be collected for 
several short, unrelated experiments during the two 
sessions, and that all experiments would be explained 
at the end of the second session. Spiro's (1975) inci­
dental instructions for processing the story were then 
delivered: 
This is an experiment concerned with changes in 
the way people react to stories involving interper­
sonal relations when there is a delay prior to giving 
the reactions. You will read a story about two peo­
ple. The story is true in all respects. I knew both 
of the people and can vouch for the accuracy of the 
story. What I would like you to do is think about 
and react to the story. At the second session I will 
ask you various kinds of questions concerning your 
reactions to the story. Are there any questions? 
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Subjects were told to use 3 minutes to read the story. 
After the allotted time the stories were collected, and 
approximately 8 minutes were employed by assigning 
subjects to second-session dates, collecting phone 
numbers for reminder calls, and instructing subjects not 
to discuss the experiment between sessions. As the 
experimenter reviewed the story requirements for the 
second session, she very casually delivered one of the 
two types of subsequent bias. (a) Bob and Margie did 
get married and are very happy together to this day 
(harmony) or (b) they never did get married; the en­
gagement was broken, and they never saw each other 
again (conflict). Therefore, consistent and contradic­
tory subsequent information was presented to subjects 
reading each story end. For example, the harmonious 
bias was consistent with the harmonious story end and 
contradictory to the story end that reported conflict. 
The Object Naming test, the Utility test, and the 
Match test were then administered in that order; pro­
cedures included reading the printed instructions aloud 
and observing the time limitations for each section. 
(For additional details, see French, Ekstrom, & Price, 
1963.) 
Half of the subjects in each acquisition group re­
turned for testing 2 days later; the remaining subjects, 
after 3 weeks. The cover page of the test booklet con­
tained the following instructions, which were read aloud 
by the experimenter: 
I'm sorry, but we deceived you. This is not a study 
of how people react to situations involving interper­
sonal relations. It is a study of memory. As you 
will recall, at the last session you read a story. 
What we would like you to do is to try to recall the 
story as best you can. The following pages contain 
questions concerning the story you read. Base your 
answer to each question on your memory for the 
story and not on your personal reactions. You 
must answer every question, and you must answer 
them in the order in which they are presented. Do 
not look ahead or behind the question you are work­
ing on. After you have answered a question, please 
rate your confidence in the answer by placing a 
number on the line at the bottom of the page. Use 
the scale below. For example, if you write "1" you 
will be indicating that you are very uncertain that 
the meaning of the sentence you wrote was explicit­
ly expressed in the story, "5" will indicate moderate 
certainty, and "9" shows absolute certainty. Are 
there any questions? 
Ten minutes were allowed for recall. 
Results and Discussion 
Cued Recall 
Scoring. Two scorers, blind to the type 
of subsequent information and retention 
interval, independently determined error 
scores for Items 6-10. Agreement about 
direction of error was 100%; agreement about 
error magnitude was 89%. Where differ­
ences existed, their absolute value was 1, and 
all differences were resolved by the scorers 
so that complete agreement was finally 
reached. 
The constructive error score (CES) for 
each subject was computed by subtracting 
from the individual item score with the 
highest absolute value the absolute value of 
the highest item score with the opposite sign. 
For example, if a set of item scores were 0, 
-3, 1, -1, 0, the CES would be -2. (Item 
scores of opposite directions rarely occurred 
within a subject's recall booklet.) This 
method of error scoring was chosen by Spiro 
(1975, 1977) to reflect that evidence for 
reconstructive memory does not depend on 
the number of errors. Rather, it is deter­
mined by the magnitude of qualitative 
change, which may be as likely to occur in 
one sentence alone as in several sentences. 
Constructive errors. Table 1 presents the 
mean CES for each condition of this exper­
iment, along with the means for the corre­
sponding free recall condition in Spiro's ex­
periment. The direction of errors (positive 
or negative) for cued recall are identical to 
those for free recall, with the exception of 
cells representing the harmonious story end, 
consistent subsequent information, 2-day 
delay. However, neither of these means is 
apparently different from zero. 
For the cued-recall experiment, the major 
finding was that the type of subsequent in­
formation interacting with the length of the 
retention interval reliably influenced mem­
ory for the story. This interaction was 
tested by allowing for all other effects in the 
linear model, due to the nonorthogonality of 
the design (Appelbaum & Cramer, 1974); 
F(1, 62) = 11.237,MSe = .0084,p < .005. Of 
the remaining possible main effects and in­
teractions, only the main effect of the sub­
sequent information was reliable beyond the 
.10 level (allowing for the other effects), F(1, 
62) = 39.574, MSe = .0084, p < .001. The 
interpretation of these effects is clear. 
When subsequent information indicated 
eventual disharmony (breaking up), subjects 
tended to impose or emphasize conflict in 
the story they read. When subsequent in­
formation indicated eventual harmony 
(marriage and happiness), conflict in the 
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Table 1 
Mean Constructive Error Scores for Cued Recall and Free Recall (Spiro, 1977) Under Incidental 
Memory Instructions 
Story end Bias 2 days 
Harmony Consistent .5 
Contradictory -.1 
Conflict Consistent -.5 
Contradictory 1.0 
story was reduced or harmony was exagger­
ated. These effects obtained primarily after 
3 weeks. 
Differences between the two experiments 
in magnitude of CES are apparent in Table 
1. For the 3-week contradictory condition, 
the magnitude of the cued-recall CES was 
lower than free-recall CES, indicating that 
the scoring procedure was perhaps more 
conservative, or that the cuing procedure in 
some way limited error magnitude. In ad­
dition, cued recall CES was greater for the 
3-week consistent conditions than was free 
recall CES. This difference may be ac­
counted for by the change in scoring proce­
dures or by the possibility that in this ex­
periment the effect of consistent subsequent 
information was to exaggerate the harmony 
or conflict in the passage. 
Confidence ratings. Spiro (1975) exam­
ined confidence ratings for sentences per­
taining only to the issue of having children; 
these sentences were presumed to be best 
examples for reflecting the subsequent bias. 
Only ratings for absolute error values of four 
or five were contrasted to ratings for error 
values of one or less. Spiro reasoned that if 
errors were a result of conscious fabrication, 
those that were greater in magnitude should 














experiment, no responses to Item 8 (con­
cerning the issue of children) were given 
error scores large enough to adopt.Spiro's 
criterion. Indeed, it is questionable if re­
sponses to this item are comparable to the 
types of freely recalled sentences that were 
judged to concern the issue of having chil­
dren; the cuing procedure is quite likely more 
restrictive. 
Due to these differences in scoring and 
procedure, the locus of schema change was 
tested by comparing ratings for correct ver­
sus incorrect responses. Such a comparison 
should be a very conservative test of Spiro's 
locus hypothesis, in that higher ratings for 
nonextreme errors should reduce the dif­
ference between correct and incorrect re­
sponse ratings. All five responses were 
employed, since all five items were designed 
to reflect the incorporation of the subse­
quent information, and since they formed 
the basis of all prior analyses. 
As can be seen in Table 2, there was a 
slight tendency in all conditions for more 
subjects to rate correct responses higher than 
incorrect responses. (For Spiro's, 1975, 
contradictory 3-week condition, the number 
of subjects showing greater confidence in 
incorrect responses was five times greater 
than those showing less or equal confidence.) 
Number of Subjects Showing Two Patterns of Confidence Ratings of Correct and 
Incorrect Responses 
Direction of difference 
in M ratings 
Incorrect � correct 
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Furthermore, for all 3-week subjects, confi­
dence in correct sentences was reliably 
greater than confidence in incorrect sen­
tences; paired-comparison t(25) = 3.230, SD 
= .409, p < .01. Since Spiro emphasized the 
rating comparison for subjects hearing con­
tradictory information, a separate test was 
performed for these subjects; once again, the 
results indicated that confidence for correct 
was greater than for incorrect recall, t(13) =: 
2.923, SD = .491, p < .02. Therefore, 
subjects tested after 3 weeks could reliably 
distinguish between their errors and correct 
recall, when they were asked to do so im­
mediately after retrieving specific informa­
tion. However, these results do not dem­
onstrate that all reconstructive effects oc­
curred during retrieval; the mean difference 
in ratings between correct and incorrect was 
slightly greater than one. Nor do the results 
implicate a conscious guessing strategy; 
lower ratings could logically reflect the dif­
ficulty of retrieving and integrating poorly 
formulated aspects of story memory. Nev­
ertheless, the existence of a rating difference 
under the conditions of this' experiment 
makes it difficult to argue that all construc­
tive effects occurred during the retention 
interval, and not during the conscious pro­
cessing of story-related information. The 
most reasonable conclusion concerning these 
results, as well as the results of other exper­
iments demonstrating memory changes, is 
that changes occur due to processes operat­
ing at all stages of information processing, 
and are guided by the task demands. 
Individual Differences 
The second purpose of this experiment 
was to examine the relationship between 
constructive memory performance and 
scores on tests of cognitive flexibility. A 
multiple regression analysis was performed, 
using group membership variables (type of 
subsequent information, time of testing, and 
their interaction) and scores on the flexibil­
ity tests as predictors, and the absolute value 
of the largest error (AES) as the outcome 
measure. AES is the appropriate measure 
for the individual difference analyses be­
cause direction of error is no longer rele­
vant. 
The most important finding was that the 
addition of the individual difference vari­
ables reliably increased the predictive ability 
of the regression equation, F(3, 63) = 3.195, 
SE = .012, p < .03; knowledge about differ­
ences in cognitive flexibility provided addi­
tional information about constructive error 
performance apart from knowing the pa­
rameters of the experimental situation. 
The predictors with weights reliably dif­
ferent from zero were type of subsequent 
information, F(1, 63) = 5.305, SE = .162, p 
< .025; the Object Naming test, F(1, 63) = 
4.438, SE = .048, p < .05; and the Match 
test, F(1, 63) = 5.176, SE = .039, p < .05. 
These three variables provided independent 
and reliable sources of information about the 
variance of AES performance. Since the 
magnitude of the standardized beta weights 
was approximately equal for the reliable 
predictors, interpreting the regression 
equation is straightforward: Occurrence of 
contradictory subsequent information and 
high scores on the adaptive flexibility test led 
to a greater degree of constructive error, and 
spontaneous flexibility was positively related 
to recall accuracy. 
The relationships of the flexibility tests to 
constructive memory performance can be 
loosely interpreted as follows: Spontaneous 
flexibility appears to indicate individual 
abilities in maintaining separate memory 
stores for the experimental materials; after 
the influence of context was determined, 
subjects with higher scores more accurately 
recalled the story. Thus, spontaneously 
flexible individuals may tend to engage in 
less automatic restructuring of their expe­
rience. In addition, adaptive flexibility may 
be indicative of the tendency to combine 
separately stored information at retrieval, as 
a function of the amount of integration re­
quired by the task. Presumably, task de­
mands are a matter of individual perception; 
for those who perceived the cues as func­
tioning for the related information, adaptive 
flexibility predicted their tendency to in­
corporate it. More generally, support has 
been provided for the assumption that the 
two types of flexibility tests tap different 
characteristics of cognitive behavior. 
Another possible view of the relationship 
of memory performance to flexibility scores 
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is to attribute this relationship to a third 
variable, general intelligence. There are 
three objections to this approach. First, 
several sources have identified measures of 
flexibility as tapping individual character­
istics that are different from those charac­
teristics measured by intelligence tests 
(Anastasi & Schaefer, 1971; Lindeman & 
Fullagar, 1975; Yamamoto, 1965). The re­
ported correlations are generally quite low 
(approximately .20), especially for individ­
uals with above average scores on intelli­
gence tests. Second, if the relationship re­
ported in this study could be partially ac­
counted for by a general intelligence factor, 
even less information about individual dif­
ferences in recall accuracy would be ob­
tained. This argument is based on the issue 
of intelligence testing and what it tells us 
about specific abilities. Guilford's factor­
analytic approach to intelligence, as well as 
the individual-difference approach of cog­
nitive psychology, emphasizes a detailed 
analysis of individual characteristics and a 
convergence of these characteristics with 
behaviors in certain experimental settings. 
Finally, Meehl (1970) has called attention 
to the fallacy of using a third factor as a co­
variate for investigating relationships be­
tween a naturally occurring characteristic 
and some outcome variable. In the present 
study, removing the variance accounted for 
by a general intelligence factor would auto­
matically allow some unknown fourth factor 
to systematically affect the relationship be­
tween flexibility and recall. In summary, 
the relationship between cognitive flexibility 
and recall merits attention in its own right, 
apart from investigating the more general 
relationship between intelligence and me­
morial performance. 
Conclusions 
The cued-recall results of this experiment 
are consistent with Spiro's (1975, 1977) 
findings concerning the influence of subse­
quent information on memory for an event. 
As the testing interval increased, the mag­
nitude of constructive errors increased, and 
their direction reflected the nature of the 
subsequent information. However, after 3 
weeks, subjects indicated more· confidence 
in correctly recalled sentences than in sen­
tences containing errors. This difference in 
recall confidence probably indicates that 
either some constructive effects occurred 
during retrieval or subjects engaged a con­
scious guessing strategy. At the very least, 
both types of recall were not produced by 
directly accessing a stable, well-integrated 
schema for ·all information related to the 
story. 
Second, the relationships between cogni­
tive flexibility and constructive errors may 
illuminate the issue concerning the locus of 
constructive effects. Both the terms used to 
distinguish the two types of flexibility tests 
and the nature of the tasks employed suggest 
that spontaneous flexibility may indicate a 
reduced tendency to restructure experience, 
whereas adaptive flexibility inay correspond 
to characteristics of integrative recall. Thus, 
the tests of cognitive flexibility may be rel­
atively independent, and furthermore, they 
may reflect relatively independent process­
ing with regard to storage and retrieval of 
real world information. 
Finally, this research has implications for 
educational theory and practice. Spiro 
(1977) has suggested that an emphasis on 
knowledge updating (incorporating new in­
formation into previous structures) rather 
than isolation for the purpose of test taking 
(as in typical memory experiments) could 
provide for richer, more particularized in­
terpretations of information. In a general 
sense, such an emphasis may encourage in- . 
accurate memory of specific information but 
increase the tendency to approach learning 
and testing situations with a more flexible 
cognitive set. The results from this experi­
ment further suggest that knowledge struc­
tures are modified both during storage and 
when information from the structures is re­
trieved. In addition, individuals probably 
differ according to the conditions under 
which they modify their schemata for events, 
and one way of specifying this difference is 
in terms of cognitive flexibility. 
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